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On March 15, 1991, Karen Lamberton received notice from the
Arizona Department of Economic Security (DES) that her Aid to
Families with Dependent Children' (AFDC) grant had been termi-
nated.2 Lamberton began receiving AFDC benefits when her hus-
band was fired from his high school teaching job and was sent to
prison.3 Lamberton's aunt gave her, for minimal consideration, a
1985 Toyota Camry when Lamberton's 1973 Datsun became so un-
reliable that she was forced to sell it.4 When Lamberton later reap-
plied for AFDC, DES denied her request because the equity in her
automobile was $4375. As her equity in the new car exceeded
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sity of Hartford, 1991; J.D. expected, University of Minnesota, 1995. The author
would like to thank Shawn Fremsted of Legal Services of Northwest Minnesota for
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their
own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to fur-
nish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as
practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent chil-
dren and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help
maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or rela-
tives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and
personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing
parental care and protection, there is hereby authorized to be appropri-
ated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of
this part.
Id. States must make assistance available to all who qualify under 42 U.S.C.
§ 606(a) (1988).
2. Complaint at 9, Lamberton v. Sullivan, No. Civ. 91-609 TUC-JMR (D. Ariz.,
Filed Oct. 24, 1991).
3. Id. at 6. Because of the loss of income, Lamberton lost her home to foreclo-
sure and she and her three daughters needed AFDC in order to survive. Id.
4. Id. At the time, Lamberton was attending a local community college in order
to acquire the employment skills needed to get off of AFDC, and her daughters were
all enrolled in schools that were not accessible by public transportation. Id.
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$1500, Lamberton's total assets were greater than those allowed
under AFDC's eligibility requirements.5
Lamberton is just one example of many AFDC recipients who
have lost or been denied benefits because of the automobile equity
limit. Approximately eight suits have been filed in federal court on
behalf of AFDC recipients, challenging this regulation.6 Although
similarly situated to recipients of Supplemental Security Income7
("SSI1), AFDC recipients must act within very different and more
restrictive eligibility requirements.8 This article argues that in or-
der to best achieve the goals of AFDC, the automobile equity limit
needs to be raised to an amount which reflects the actual value of a
reliable automobile, or ideally, eliminated altogether. Part II de-
scribes the administrative and judicial history of AFDC and other
Social Security Act programs, and how hostility towards AFDC re-
5. Coverage and Conditions of Eligibility in Financial Assistance Programs, 45
C.F.R. § 233.20 (a)(3)(i)(B) (1992).
The amount of real and personal property that can be reserved for each
assistance unit shall not be in excess of one thousand dollars equity
value (or such lesser amount as the State specifies in its State plan)
excluding only: ...
(2) One automobile, up to $1500 of equity value or such lower limit as
the State may specify in the State plan; (any excess equity value must
be applied towards the general resource limit specified in the State
plan) ....
Id. If the recipient has real and personal property valued at less than the above
limitation, the difference may be added to the value of the recipients automobile. Id.
6. See, e.g., Applehans v. Beye, Civil Action No. 92-N-2495 (D. Colo., case filed
Feb. 26, 1993); Brown v. Shalala, Civ. No. C-92-184-L (D.N.H. July 27, 1993); Cham-
pion v. Sullivan, Civ. No. 3-92-CV-10127 (S.D. Iowa filed August 18, 1992); Falin v.
Sullivan, 776 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D.Va. 1991), aff'd per curiam, Falin v. Shalala, 1993
WL 382463 (4th Cir. 1993); Gamboa v. Rubin, Civil No. 92-00367HMF (D. Hawaii);
Hazard v. Sullivan, 827 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D. Tenn. 1993); Lamberton v. Sullivan, No.
Civ 91-609 TUC-JMR (D. Ariz, Filed Oct. 24, 1991); We Who Care v. Sullivan, 756 F.
Supp. 42 (D.Me. 1991).
7. SSI is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988). The purpose of the act is to "estab-
lish[ ] a national program to provide supplemental security income to individuals
who have attained age 65 or are blind or disabled . . . . " Id. Like AFDC, SSI is a
need based program, but it is not state funded. With all of its funding coming from
the federal government, it does not have the pressure from the state governments to
keep down spending. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
Generally, individuals cannot receive both AFDC and SSI. COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., 1993 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA
ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
July 7, 1993 at 818 [hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. However, if a recipient or one of their
children is disabled, the family unit is eligible for both. Id. SSI reduces the pay-
ments received by the amount received by the amount of AFDC benefits received.
Id.
8. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1218(b)(1)(iv) and (b)(2) allows an SSI recipient to have
$4500 equity in any automobile. However, if the auto is a necessity (needed to go to
doctors appointments), there is no limit on the amount of equity allowed. Id. 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(24)(1988) requires that a member of a family receiving benefits
under SSI not be considered as part of the household for determining benefits or
eligibility for AFDC purposes.
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cipients has lead to inaction concerning the equity limit. Part III
illustrates the practical effects of the automobile equity limitation
and how it undermines the self-reliance and independence which
AFDC should be fostering among its recipients. Part IV discusses
the ways in which the AFDC limitation is currently being chal-
lenged and analyzes the viability of each of these efforts. Part V
examines possible alternatives to court challenges. Finally, Part VI
suggests which approach or mix of approaches are most likely to
change the eligibility requirement.
I. AFDC
A. How It Works
AFDC today is a system of "cooperative federalism."9 This
means that the federal government has set up the basic eligibility
guidelines, and provides the states with matching funds to support
the program. The states may adjust eligibility requirements only
where specifically authorized.' 0 Among other requirements, a state
must have "in effect and operation a job opportunities and basic
skills training program... [and] require all recipients.., to partici-
pate in the program."" In fact, a state may withdraw or deny bene-
fits to a recipient who refuses to take a job offered either through
the state unemployment agency or private employers.' 2
B. A Brief History of AFDC
President Theodore Roosevelt initiated the first nation-
wide policy to aid poor children in a 1909 White House confer-
9. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
10. For instance, the states are authorized to establish need levels for the state,
but they must
take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or
relative claiming aid to families with dependent children, or of any
other individual (living in the same home as such child and relative)
whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining
the need of the child or relative claiming such aid ....
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(1988). The equity limit for automobiles was established by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, but states are allowed to set an even
lower equity limit if they chose. See supra note 5.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)&(B)(i)(I)(Supp. II 1988). This provision gives sev-
eral exemptions, including ones for students, disabled persons, remote locations, ill-
ness, and small children in the home among others. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19XA)(i)-
(ix) (Supp. II 1988).
12. N.Y. Dept. of Social Services v. Dublin, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
1994]
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ence. 13 As part of the policy's establishment,14 the conferees deter-
mined that
[c]hildren of parents of worthy character[,] suffering from tem-
porary misfortune, and children of reasonably efficient and de-
serving mothers who are without the support of the normal
breadwinner should, as a rule[,] be kept with their parents,
such aid being given as may be necessary to maintain suitable
homes for the rearing of children. 15
The state laws which followed this policy were burdened by a re-
quirement that their beneficiaries be deemed worthy.16 In 1931,
eighty-two percent of the recipients were widows, ninety-six per-
cent were white, and three percent African-American.17 Half of the
African-American recipients were in Ohio and Pennsylvania.18
During the 1930's, New Deal Social Security legislation estab-
lished four federally subsidized, state run welfare programs: Aid to
Dependent Children ("ADC", now "AFDC"), Old Age Assistance
("OAA"), Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled ("APTD")
and Aid to the Blind ("AB").19 The architects of these programs
hoped that with the expansion of Social Security, the need for ADC
would disappear.2O Widows, who previously received ADC, would
now be eligible for Social Security.21
However, beginning in 1960, AFDC began to expand from a
widows' program to a program for deserted or never married
mothers and began to include more African-American mothers. 22
13. Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 457, 472 (1987-88).
14. Beginning in the 19th century, two distinct classes of poor families devel-
oped. Those families who were "poor by misfortune", such as deceased soldiers fami-
lies, were considered deserving, and treated in state institutions. Those whose
poverty could not be explained away were considered undeserving, and therefore left
to their own devises rather than being supported by the state and/or charitable insti-
tutions. Id. at 470-472.
15. WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 4 (1965) (quoting Proceedings
of the Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, S. Doc. No. 721, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1909)).
16. Within ten years of the conference, 39 states had enacted legislation allocat-
ing funds for poor deserving parents - parents whose "poverty was unaccompanied
by the usual vices ... such as drunkenness, bad moral habits, a poor environment
.... " Handler, supra note 13, at 473.
17. BELL, supra note 15, at 9.
18. Id.
19. OAA - 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.; AB - 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.; ATPD - 42
U.S.C. § 1351 et seq. OAA, AB and APTD were replaced by the Supplemental Secur-
ity Income Program in 1974. GREEN BOOK, supra note 7, at 813. In 1962, Pub. L. 87-
543, § 104(a)(3)(B) substituted "aid to families with dependent children" for "aid to
dependent children" in the language of the statute.
20. Handler, supra note 13, at 479.
21. Id.
22. M. KATz, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 33 (1986).
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Courts also began to eliminate blatant moral evaluations in the eli-
gibility process. For example, the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in
King v. Smith23 invalidated the "man-in-the-house" rule, which al-
lowed the state to withdraw benefits if a mother was cohabitating
with a man in or outside of the house.24 The court-forced expansion
of the pool of eligible recipients, together with the inclusion of previ-
ously excluded groups steadily increased the bureaucracy associ-
ated with AFDC.25 In reaction to the workload, states went about
"reasserting quality control," an effort to deny benefits based on
procedural problems and to place the burden of proving eligibility
on the applicants. 26 The state-run AFDC programs went from try-
ing to exclude the unworthy to excluding whomever possible
through procedural means in order to ease the increasing burden on
the system.
C. AFDC vs. SSI
The public began to perceive the recipients of AFDC as less
worthy than the recipients of other social services, such as OAA and
other SSI precursors. 27 This public perception of the elderly as
having made their contribution to society sharply contrasts with
the public perception that AFDC "acts merely as a cushion to sup-
port those too lazy to work."2s The entitlement system, while less
likely to contain the overt hostility exemplified by King v. Smith,29
continued to make determinations of worthiness. For instance, one
commentator has described Social Security as "the pension and sur-
vivors insurance program for those who have made their employ-
23. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
24. Some state and local authorities would conduct 'midnight raids' on welfare
homes to determine if there was a man living in the home. Sylvia A. Law, Women,
Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249, 1259
n.34 (1983).
25. Handler, supra note 13, at 481 (quoting S. GALM, WELFARE- AN ADMINISTRA-
TIVE NIGHTMARE, STAFF STUDY PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL POLICY
OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, STUDIES IN
PUBLIC WELFARE, PAPER No. 5 (Part 1) (1972)).
26. Id. at 481-483. Reasserting quality control, according to Handler, was the
process of using eligibility and other rules to make the application process and re-
ceipt of AFDC as exclusionary as possible. Id.
27. Id. at 480.
By the early 1970s, the prevailing view was that the elderly had made
their contribution to society. The creation and expansion of the Social
Security system contributed to the transformation in societal attitudes
by incorporating the vast majority of the elderly into the deserving cate-
gory. In addition, the elderly poor are white, they do not have out-of-
wedlock children, and they vote.
Id.
28. Law, supra note 24, at 1279.
29. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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ment contribution to society and are now morally excused from
work."30 Even among Social Security recipients benefits are related
to earnings, thereby maintaining a difference in allocation between
the wealthy and the poor.
SSI, like AFDC, is considered a program of last resort for the
low income elderly and the disabled.31 However, unlike AFDC, the
expectations which come with SSI are not as burdensome. While
AFDC recipients are expected to become independent, SSI recipi-
ents are assumed to be recipients for life.32 This presumption may
have a stigmatizing effect of its own, but it does not force the recipi-
ents to repeatedly prove they are worthy of aid.33 The eligibility
requirements concerning automobiles and personal property imply
that SSI beneficiaries are permitted and expected to maintain a cer-
tain standard of living, while AFDC recipients are supposed to give
up all material well being before receiving any aid. Generally,
AFDC recipients are young, unemployed single mothers.3 4 Also,
there is a higher percentage of minority recipients in AFDC than in
other entitlement programs.3 5 Historically, this country has been
ambivalent about helping single mothers,36 and especially single
mothers of color.37 SSI recipients tend to be whiter, older, not as
30. Handler, supra note 13, at 479.
31. GREEN BOOK, supra note 7, at 818.
32. Unlike AFDC, the SSI program does not have job training requirements for
recipients. This may have to do with the fact that the majority of recipients are
either elderly and already eligible for Social Security or permanently disabled. Id. at
844, T.16.
33. See supra notes 4 & 5.
34. Table 31 of the GREEN BOOK lists the father's relationship to the youngest
child (natural, adoptive, step or no father), 91% of the respondents listed no father.
GREEN BOOK, supra note 7, at 698.
35. In 1991, 38.1% of AFDC recipients were white, 38.8% black and 17.4% His-
panic. Id. at 697.
36. In a recent article, conservative commentator George F. Will advocated the
ideas of sociologist Charles Murray. George F. Will, Rebuild embankments against
illegitimacy, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS), Nov. 19, 1993, at 29A. Murray would have
the government "end all economic support for single mothers. Marriage should be
the sole legal institution through which parental rights and responsibilities are de-
fined and exercised." Id.
37. Handler, supra note 13, at 482. AFDC benefits, which are state determined,
range from 13-79% of the poverty rate, with the median being 39%. When AFDC
benefits are combined with food stamp benefits the range increases to 44-102%, with
the median being 70%. GREEN BOOK, supra note 7, at 657-8.
This article relies heavily on Joel Handler's thesis as an explanation of the pre-
vailing attitude towards AFDC and its recipients. Handler determined that the con-
sensus over welfare, as illustrated in the Family Support Act of 1988, "represents a
deep hostility to the female headed household in poverty." Handler, supra note 13, at
459.
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poor, and have better employment histories than AFDC
recipients. 38
D. Judicial History of Social Security Act Programs
On at least two occasions the United States Supreme Court
has invalidated Social Security Act regulations as violations of the
14th Amendment. In Department of Agriculture v. Moreno39 the
Court invalidated a regulation that made households with one
member unrelated to any other ineligible for food stamps. 40
More recently, in Califano v. Westcott,41 the Court invalidated
a regulation which allowed only male members of AFDC house-
holds to receive AFDC-Unemployed Father ("AFDC-UF") bene-
fits.42 This regulation presented an ideal situation for an equal
protection challenge.43 The law established a system which gave
benefits to one group, based on the fact that they were men, while
not giving them to another because they were women. 4 4 The Court
refused to say that giving benefits based on a gender classification
was rationally related to the purpose of AFDC-UF.45
In Jefferson v. Hackney,46 plaintiffs alleged that by determin-
ing AFDC benefits through a lower percentage reduction factor47
38. 39.2% of SSI recipients are men, 48.8 % are white, 24.5% are black. GREEN
BOOK, supra note 7, at 843. Of the 5,485,788 SSI recipients, approximately 4 million
are disabled or blind, and the rest are elderly. Id. at 841. Like AFDC, SSI is a need
based program, however, even at its lowest, SSI benefits alone have disbersed
amounts equal to at least 80% of the poverty rate for couples since 1975. Currently,
SSI payments equal 89.5%, and when combined with Social Security and food
stamps, it is 101.6% of the poverty rate. Id. at 837.
39. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
40. Id. at 543. The regulation was enacted to avoid fraud, but according to Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion, the classification actually prevented those most in need from
getting help. Id. at 538. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, identified the
fundamental interest being infringed upon as the right to association. In Douglas'
opinion, had the First Amendment not been involved, Dandridge v. Williams, 392
U.S. 471 (1970) would have controlled, and the regulation would have been valid. Id.
at 544; see infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text for discussion of Dandridge.
41. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
42. Id. at 88-89.
43. The regulation gave unemployment benefits to fathers in AFDC households,
but did not give them to mothers. Id. at 83. For an in-depth review of equal protec-
tion analysis, see NowAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 490 (4th ed. 1991).
44. Califano, the Secretary, alleged that the gender classification was based on
the premise that it would "deter real or pretend desertion by the father in order to
make his family eligible for AFDC benefits." Westcott, 443 U.S. at 83.
45. "It is, rather, part of the 'baggage of sexual stereotypes' that presumes the
father has the 'primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,' while the
mother is the 'center of home and family life'." Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
46. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
47. In a percentage reduction factor system, the state establishes a level of need
for entitlement program beneficiaries. That standard is then reduced to a fixed per-
centage in order to determine the actual grant. Id. at 539. If the standard of need
1994]
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(75%) than used in determining AB (95%), OAA (100%), and APTD
(95%), the State of Texas was infringing on the AFDC beneficiaries'
equal protection rights.48 Texas applied the percentage reduction
factor in order to keep welfare spending below the ceiling mandated
by the state constitution.49 Plaintiffs argued that the "distinction
between the programs [was] not rationally related to the purposes
of the Social Security Act" under which all four programs were
established.5 0
Jefferson plaintiffs also raised an equal protection claim based
on the fact that a higher proportion of AFDC recipients were Afri-
can-American or Hispanic than white.51 The Court rejected this ar-
gument, saying that
[tihe standard of judicial review is not altered because of appel-
lants' unproven allegations of racial discrimination. [The lower
court found] that the 'payment by Texas of a lesser percentage
of unmet needs to the recipients of the AFDC than to the recipi-
ents of other welfare programs is not the result of racial or eth-
nic prejudice... '52
As long as "the judgements are rational, and not invidious" the leg-
islature's attempt to attack the problems of poverty one step at a
time were not subject to a strict scrutiny test.53
Applying the traditional standard of review under that amend-
ment, we cannot say that Texas' decision to provide somewhat
lower welfare benefits for AFDC recipients is invidious or irra-
tional. Since budgetary constraints do not allow the payment of
the full standard of need for all welfare recipients, the State
may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the least able
of the categorical grant recipients to bear the hardships of an
inadequate standard of living.5 4
for a two person AFDC family were $100 per month and the reduction standard was
75%, they would receive $75 per month. At the time of the initial challenge, rather
than determining one percentage reduction factor for AFDC and the SSI programs,
the State of Texas varied theirs from 50% for AFDC to 100% for OAA. By the time
the case was reviewed by the Supreme Court, the AFDC percentage had risen to
75%. Id. at 537; see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
48. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537. OAA - 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.; AB - 42 U.S.C.
§ 1201 et seq.; ATPD - 42 U.S.C. § 1351 et seq. As of 1974, these programs were
replaced by SSI. GREEN BooK, supra note 7, at 813.
49. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537.
50. Id. at 538.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 547.
53. Id. at 546.
54. Had the court wanted to, it may have been possible to find irrationality in
Texas' scheme. The decision shows that AFDC had from 50% to 100% more Black
and Chicano recipients than the other three programs. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 546.
And, despite having the lowest percentage reduction factor, AFDC did not have the
most recipients, OAA had 94,000 more. Id. The burdens of the state's constitutional
budget limit were disproportionately placed on the minority community as a result of
the scheme. Unfortunately, the existence of a more rational scheme - lessening the
[Vol. 12:529536
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The Court refused to question the judgement of the state in
allocating its limited resources, even in the face of differential im-
pact on minority groups.55 The dissenters, on the other hand,
based their opinions largely on the statutory requirements of eligi-
bility under 42 U.S.C. § 602.56 While Justice Marshall relied on
this statutory conflict in his dissent, he also stated that the various
reviewing courts had erroneously neglected exacting analysis and
emphasis upon the the racial makeup of the AFDC recipients.57
The decision in Jefferson relies heavily on Dandridge v. Wil-
liams.5 8 In Dandridge, the Supreme Court refused to make wealth
a protected class for equal protection analysis. An AFDC recipient
challenged Maryland's maximum grant regulation, which limited a
family's benefits once the family went beyond a certain size.S9 The
Supreme Court has never established a fundamental interest in a
minimum standard of living.6 0
OAA percentage and raising the AFDC percentage - does not necessarily make the
first scheme irrational or unconstitutional. Id. at 549.
55. A law containing an otherwise neutral classification, even when even
handedly applied "may be challenged as in reality constituting a device designed to
impose different burdens on different classes of people. NowAK & RrTuNDA, supra
note 43, at 591. However, "[wjhen the governmental action relates only to matters of
economics or general social welfare, the law need only rationally relate to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose." Id. at 569.
56. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 567-68 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall determined the scheme invalid because it violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(23), which required the states to bring their AFDC benefits in line with the
increased cost of living between the time the program was established and 1969. Id.
57. Id. at 575 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
The evidence also shows that 87% of the AFDC recipients in Texas are
either Negro or Mexican-American. Yet, both the District Court and
this Court have little difficulty in concluding that the fact that AFDC is
politically unpopular and the fact that AFDC recipients are disfavored
by the State and its citizens, have nothing whatsoever to do with the
racial makeup of the program. This conclusion is neither so apparent,
nor so correct in my view.
Id. Justice Marshall did not try to determine whether or not racial discrimination
existed. After determining that the Texas scheme was invalid on the basis of the
statute, and he only responded to the court's determination of the standard of review
for the equal protection claim, and determined that the burden of proof had been
wrongly placed on the plaintiffs. Id.
58. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
59. Id. at 473. The fundamental interest being harmed was the family's right to
procreate. However, the court "proceeded on the tacit and not unreasonable premise
that the availability or unavailability of funds adequate to satisfy a prospective
child's minimum needs did not materially influence parents' decisions" to procreate.
Gary J. Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. Rzv. 663, 675 (1977).
60. Simson, supra note 59, at 675.
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The Supreme Court has also validated procedural due process
challenges to entitlement program regulations.61 Procedural due
process can be violated when a right to a benefit is taken away
without an adequate determination of the need to take away the
benefit.6 2 In U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry,6 3 the plaintiffs
were denied food stamp benefits because a member of the household
had been claimed as a dependent for tax purposes by someone
outside of the household.6 4 The Court held that the "irrebuttable
presumption" - that a tax deduction taken by a person outside of
the home made the household automatically ineligible for benefits
- was "not a rational measure" of need.65
It is within this framework of bureaucracy, institutional atti-
tudes, and judicial lack of interest that the automobile equity
limit6 6 was established. The automobile equity regulation was in-
cluded in the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA"),67
a measure taken explicitly to reduce the federal budget deficit.68
Prior to OBRA, an AFDC recipient could have up to $2000 of equity
in personal property, and there was no limit on one's equity in a
home or car. With the enactment of OBRA, there was a reduction
in the amount of equity recipients could have in their personal
61. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); U.S. Dept. of Agric. v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
62. U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973).
63. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
64. Id. at 511. There were seven named plaintiffs in the case. Most of them were
mothers who lived with older children, but absent fathers were claiming the children
as dependents. Because of the fathers' actions, the mothers' households were ineligi-
ble for food stamps. There were also several young married couples whose parents
were still claiming them as dependents, even though the couples lived apart from
their parents and were otherwise eligible for Food Stamps. Id. at 509-511. In none
of the cases did the tax status of dependent result from any actual financial assist-
ance by the absent parents. Id.
The Court made two determinations. First, the fact that a person is claimed as
a dependent for tax purposes does not mean that they are not indigent. Id. at 514.
Second, because food stamp eligibility is determined by household, rather than indi-
vidually, the household could be denied "even though the remaining members have
no relation to the parent who used the tax deduction, even though they are com-
pletely destitute, and even though they are one, or 10 or 20 in number." Id.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 5.
67. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2301-2321,
95 Stat. 357, 843-60 (Amending Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601-610 (1976)(codi-
fled as 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610, 612,614, 615, 645 (Supp. V 1981)). The actual purpose
of the automobile equity limit is not clear. See infra note 120 and accompanying
text.
68. For one explanation of the OBRA amendments, see Philadelphia Citizens in
Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 879 (3d Cir. 1982). "The primary purpose of the
OBRA amendments to the AFDC program is to reduce or eliminate welfare benefits
for those considered by Congress to be less needy than those completely without re-
sources .... . Id. at 879.
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property (now $1000) and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (the "Secretary") was instructed to establish a limit for
automobiles.69
The $1500 limit was established based on a 1979 survey of
Food Stamp recipients. According to the Secretary's reading of the
survey,70 96% of food stamp recipients with automobiles had less
than $1500 equity in their cars. As 80% of AFDC recipients were
also food stamp recipients, 7 1 the Secretary determined that the
limit was appropriate. No provision was included to increase the
limit based on inflation or the average price of cars. The legislation
does, however, allow a recipient with less than the allowed amount
in one category to apply the difference to the other category. 7 2
SSI recipients are also subject to some limits on the value of
their automobiles. However, the limits are much more generous.
The regulations limit the amount of equity in an automobile to
$4500, but also allow complete exemptions to the limitation when it
is necessary for employment, medical treatment, or when a modi-
fied automobile is necessary to accommodate a handicapped recipi-
ent.7 3 SSI beneficiaries may further have $2000 in personal
property or $3000 if they have an eligible spouse.74
II. Practical Effects of the Limitation
The effects of the automobile equity regulation for AFDC re-
cipients vary from the inconvenience of having an unreliable auto-
mobile to the inability to attend school and/or job training;
education required for AFDC beneficiaries to continue receiving
their grants.7 5 For example, in Lamberton v. Sullivan,76 the plain-
69. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1988). The Secretary can determine
someone ineligible for AFDC if their assets exceed $1000, not including "so much of
the family member's ownership interest in one automobile as does not exceed such
amount as the Secretary may prescribe." Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 5.
70. The Secretary's reading is somewhat questionable. Although HHS claims
that the survey showed that 96% of AFDC recipients had autos worth less than
$1500, some current challenges have attempted to show that even using this survey
was not rational. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
71. Falin v. Sullivan, 776 F.Supp. 1097, 1101 (E.D. Va. 1991); aff'd per curiam,
Falin v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993).
72. For example, if you have only $500 in personal property assets, you may have
$2000 equity value in your automobile.
73. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1218(a).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(1988).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)(Supp II 1988). See supra note 9. In Lamberton's
case, she is a student at a local community college, and her three children are in
elementary school and day care. Without a car, neither she nor the children are able
to get to school. Complaint at 6, Lamberton v. Sullivan, No. Civ. 91-609 TUC-JMR
(D. Ariz, Filed Oct. 24, 1991).
76. No. Civ. 91-609 TUC-JMR (D. Ariz., Filed Oct. 24, 1991).
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tiff lives in a rural area, where there is little public transportation,
and a car is the only way to get around. 7 7 Another variable is the
beneficiary's state of residence. A beneficiary in Minnesota, for ex-
ample, needs a car that will be reliable during the winter months.
On the other hand, for a beneficiary in New York City, an automo-
bile of any value might be an unnecessary asset. The regulation,
however, fails to take into account these differences in transporta-
tion needs within and among the states. Furthermore, despite the
fact that AFDC recipients by definition have children and are re-
quired to attend job training, they, unlike SSI recipients, have the
excessively restrictive asset limitations and are unable to avoid the
limitations when they are overly burdensome. In some states,
AFDC beneficiaries can have their grants reduced or denied if their
children miss school more than the proscribed number of times.7 8
Thus, requiring an AFDC recipient to maintain an unreliable auto-
mobile may further jeopardize that recipient's AFDC grant if she
relies upon the automobile to transport her children to or from
school.
A study conducted for the plaintiffs in We Who Care v. Sulli-
van 79 outlined the flaws in the equity limitation from an economic
standpoint.8 0 The study first outlines the purposes of AFDC and
determines how an accurate automobile equity limit should be de-
termined.S1 The study also takes into account the expense of hav-
77. Complaint, supra note 75, at 6-7.
78. "Learnfare" operates in Maryland, Wisconsin, Ohio and in a modified form in
Virginia. Seventeen other states introduced similar legislation during the 1992 leg-
islative sessions. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification
Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L. J. 719-20 (1992).
79. 756 F. Supp. 42 (D. Me. 1991).
80. PETER S. FISHER, AN ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE BASIS FOR AND CON-
SEQUENCES OF THE H.H.S. RULE ELIMINATING FROM ELIGIBILITY FOR AFDC BENEFITS
FAMILIES WHO HAVE OVER $1,500 EQUITY IN A MOTOR VEHICLE, Prepared for Pine
Tree Legal Assistance Augusta, Maine, May, 1990 (in Exhibit C, Lamberton v. Sulli-
van, No. Civ 91-609 TUC-JMR (D. Ariz. filed Oct. 24, 1991)).
81. Id. The study determined that the original purpose of AFDC was to aid chil-
dren by encouraging their adult guardians to attain self sufficiency. Further, this
goal has been reaffirmed in the most recent legislation affecting AFDC. The Family
Support Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-485) requires the state to establish JOBS pro-
grams (Job Opportunities and Basic Skills). JOBS is a mandatory program which
gives AFDC beneficiaries employment and educational training. JOBS also requires
that the state reimburse participants for their transportation costs. Id. at 1-4.
A limitation on the equity in an automobile, then, should not inter-
fere with the clear purpose of Congress to facilitate participation by
AFDC recipients in JOBS programs. Nor would it make sense to force
recipients to sell a reliable auto and purchase a less reliable one,
thereby increasing the likelihood that the State (and the Federal gov-
ernment through a 50% match) will have to incur greater expense in
providing transportation to enable such participation.
Id. at 4.
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ing an unreliable car, the differences in fuel economy between older
and newer cars, and the transaction costs involved in selling a more
expensive car and purchasing, insuring and registering one that
falls within the limit.s2
The most striking finding of the study is the effect of inflation
over the 11 years between the food stamp survey and 1990. During
this time, the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers
("CPI-U") rose from 70.5 to 117.4, "impl[ying] a 66.5% increase in
the price of transportation goods and services between 1979 and
1990."83 An automobile comparable to one meeting the $1500 eq-
uity limit in 1979 would cost $2498 in 1990; an automobile costing
$1500 in 1990 is equivalent to an equity limit of $901 in 1979.84 By
1993, because of the effect of inflation on the average price of
automobiles, the limitation has lost a rational connection to its pur-
pose.85 Relying on OBRA as the source of the regulation,86 one can
see why Congress may have intended to place limits on the number
of prospective AFDC recipients. However, OBRA certainly does not
require the Secretary to promulgate regulations which would grad-
ually exclude the majority of otherwise eligible recipients. If in fact
this was Congress' intention, then perhaps courts should require an
explicit authorization rather than allow the Secretary do so without
any scrutiny.8 7
III. Efforts to Change the Equity Limit
Currently there are two theories upon which challenges to en-
titlement regulations are based. The first is a claim that a particu-
lar regulation is an "arbitrary and capricious" application of the
82. Id. at 6-7.
The asset limit clearly forces single parents or recently unemployed
parents in such circumstances into making what would otherwise be an
irrational and uneconomic decision-to sell a car of known reliability
and good condition and attempt to purchase a cheaper one and expose
oneself to the risks of greater downtime and repair expenses and higher
operating costs.
Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 12.
84. Id. at 12-13. In order to meet the equity limit, a recipient would have to own
a "1982-83 or older model domestic car or a 1981-82 or older import, which is to say
one must own a car at least seven to nine years old and with about 90,000 miles on
it." Id. at 17 (quoting N.A.D.A. OFFICIL USED CAR GUIDE (New England Ed., May
1990)).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 111-112.
86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
87. The Secretary's ability to promulgate rules is limited by the rule's effect on




rule promulgating power.8 8 Secondly, at least one case claims that
application of an entitlement regulation violates equal protection.8 9
Unfortunately, neither of these approaches solves the problem com-
pletely. While an arbitrary and capricious challenge is currently
the most direct and effective form of relief, it is a short-term repair
because it only serves to invalidate a specific regulation, and re-
quires repeated challenges as newer limits becomes outdated.90
Equal Protection challenges, if accepted, would create a standard
for eligibility that would rationally reflect current economic condi-
tions. However, they have not been well received by the Supreme
Court, as the Court refuses to either establish wealth as a suspect
classification or create a fundamental right to a minimum standard
of living.9 1 Actions alleging a violation of procedural due process,
on the other hand, have been more successful. The Supreme Court
has held that once a person receives entitlements, the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment requires a fair adjudication to take
them away.9 2
Another promising way to create change for AFDC benefi-
ciaries is through legislative action. 93 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) serves
as an example of the type of legislation, at the national level, that
88. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
Scope of Review[:] To the extent necessary to decision and when
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The re-
viewing court shall- ...
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law....
Id. Congress may explicitly or implicitly delegate to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services the authority to establish regulations based on legislation it has
passed. See infra, notes 95-137 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
courts' review of these regulations.
89. Complaint at 38, Lamberton v. Sullivan, No. Civ. 91-609 TUC-JMR (D. Ariz.,
Filed Oct. 24, 1991).
90. Because of the limited resources and incomes of AFDC recipients, they are
unlikely to bring challenges themselves. All of the challenges mentioned in this arti-
cle have been brought by legal aid attorneys working on behalf of the beneficiaries.
91. The idea of establishing property rights in entitlement benefits has been
widely discussed by academics, but has only had limited success in practical applica-
tions. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969); Charles Reich, The New Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964); Gary J. Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discrimina-
tory Effects under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1977).
92. A fair adjudication does not, however, require an actual court proceeding. An
administrative hearing is sufficient. NowAK & RoTuNDA, supra note 38, at 490. See,
eg., Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); U.S. Dept of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S.
508 (1973).
93. As exemplified by MiNN. STAT. § 256.734, Waiver of AFDC barriers to Em-
ployment, requesting a waiver from the current equity limit.
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would be necessary to keep AFDC benefits and eligibility in line
with inflation and the cost of living. Enacted as a one time adjust-
ment, § 602(a)(23) required the states to increase the need basis for
AFDC so that it reflected the increased cost of living between the
time the basis was set and 1969, the date the statute was enacted
by Congress. 9 4
A. "Arbitrary and Capricious"
When administrative agencies establish rules at the behest of
Congress, the courts are not likely to interfere, unless there is an
obvious error in judgement.95 In Chevron v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 9 6 the Supreme Court laid out the review it will give
agency constructions. First, the Court will examine whether Con-
gress has directly spoken on the issue at hand.97
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there
is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate
a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legisla-
tive regulations are given controlling weight unless they are ar-
bitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.98
In the event that the delegation is "implicit rather than explicit...
a court may not substitute its own construction for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency."99 The
court defers to the judgment of an administrative agency whenever
the "decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force
of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon
more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations."l oo
All of the challenges to the automobile equity limit have fo-
cused on this area of judicial review.'O' In Hazard v. Sullivan,'0 2
the District Court of Tennessee permanently enjoined the Secretary
from applying the limit to Tennessee AFDC recipients.' 0 3 The reg-
ulation in question is the result of an explicit delegation of author-
94. See infra notes 143-148 and accompanying text.
95. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
96. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. Id. at 842.
98. Id. at 843-44.
99. Id. at 844.
100. Id. (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,382 (1961)).
101. See supra note 6.
102. 827 F. Supp. 1348 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
103. Id. The specific factual background of the case is not explained. Like Kut-
scher, the plaintiffs were denied AFDC benefits because the automobile they owned
exceeded the limit on eligibility. Id.
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ity from Congress to the Secretary,l0 4 and therefore is given a great
deal of deference by the courts. 10 5 The District Court, however, did
not stop here with its analysis. Even though the Congress explicitly
authorized the Secretary to establish the limit, the court still deter-
mined that the regulation could be arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not in-
tended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
or the product of agency expertise.' 0 6
The agency must explain its reasoning in a way that does not ap-
pear to be "counsel's post hoc rationalizations . ... "107 Although
the Court expressed some doubt about the reasonableness of using
a 1979 survey in 1982, it did not directly address this point.108 In-
stead, it looked at the reasons for using the specific $1500 limit.
Given the overlap between AFDC recipients and Food Stamp
recipients,l0 9
the Secretary sought to set an asset exclusion amount that
would not in itself lead to application denials but would rather
keep the 'vast majority' of recipients in the program. The 50
percent reduction in allowable resources, as explicitly estab-
lished by Congress through OBRA was to effect the reduction in
welfare pay-outs; the automobile allowance, by the Secretary's
own words, was intended to preserve eligibility, not diminish
it. l1O
The Secretary argued that because Congress had failed to explicitly
include an adjustment for inflation, the court was barred from re-
viewing the effects of inflation.Il' This silence on the part of Con-
gress concerning the effects of inflation did not persuade the court,
however, especially where the Secretary
rendered this silence unimportant by promulgating a rationale
for the regulation that implied sensitivity to changing financial
conditions. Even if the Secretary generally has no affirmative
duty to review regulations in the absence of congressional direc-
104. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
105. See supra text accompanying note 95.
106. Hazard v. Sullivan, 827 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
107. Id. at 1352 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)).
108. Id. "The court does not decide this case by determining whether the 1979
Food Stamp survey initially provided a rational basis for the $1,500 limit, even
though the advisability of relying on this study in 1982 is debatable.. . ." Id.
109. Falin v. Sullivan, 776 F.Supp. 1097, 1098 (E.D. Va. 1991); aff'd per curiam,
Falin v. Shalala, 1993 WL 382463 (4th Cir. 1993). See supra text accompanying note
71.
110. Hazard, 827 F. Supp. at 1352.
111. Id.
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tion to do so, where a regulation's rationality is dependent on
current socioeconomic conditions periodic review is essential to
preserve that rationality. 112
Thus, the Tennessee Federal District Court held that a regulation
that is reasonable at the time it is promulgated may be arbitrary
and capricious if it no longer rationally relates to the justification
given by the promulgating body.13 Twelve years of inflation was
sufficient to destroy the regulations' rationality.l14
Prior to the decision in Tennessee, the Federal District Court
of Maine, in We Who Care v. Sullivan,11 also invalidated the auto-
mobile equity regulation. The Maine court, however, did so because
the court was unable to "'make a substantial inquiry' into the fac-
tors relied on by HHS in formulating the regulation, and thus it
[had] no basis for holding that the Secretary has provided a 'rea-
soned basis' for its promulgation."'" 6 Although the Court went
through an analysis of the review necessary similar to that of the
Hazard court, the regulation was never actually reviewed.
The only district court to uphold the regulation has been the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In Falin
v. Sullivan,117 this court looked at the reasons for Congressional
enactment of OBRA, rather than at the reasons for the Secretary's
promulgation of the specific regulation.l' 8 The Falin court rea-
soned that since OBRA was enacted primarily to cut the federal
budget deficit, any cost cutting measure, such as limiting the
number of AFDC beneficiaries through tightened eligibility require-
ments, would be reasonably related to that purpose. 1 19 This rea-
soning, however, becomes strained if the regulation, at the time of
promulgation, included the vast majority of AFDC recipients or pro-
spective recipients. The Secretary's reasoning, that the limitation
was intended to include the majority of the then eligible AFDC pop-
112. Id. at 1353. 47 Fed. Reg. 5657 (198X) provides an explanation of the Secre-
tary's motive behind using the 1979 survey. Some commentators were concerned
about using $1500 as the limit. The Secretary responded: "In that the federal maxi-
mum limit should be set within the range of the vast majority of current recipients"
and assuming the reliance on the food stamp survey was accurate "this limit appears
reasonable and supportable." Id.
113. Id. at 1354.
114. Id.
115. 756 F. Supp. 42, 47 (D. Me. 1991).
116. Id. at 46. The food stamp survey was never a part of the administrative
record of the case, and the Secretary "assertfed] that 'an exhaustive search of the
existing administrative record did not discover the cited 1979 food stamp sur-
vey .... '" Id. at 46 n. 6.
117. 776 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1991); aff'd per curiam, Falin v. Shalala, 1993
WL 382463 (4th Cir. 1993).
118. Falin, 776 F. Supp. at 1100.
119. Id. at 1100-02.
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ulation, appears to be the most reasonable interpretation of the
statute.120
B. Equal Protection Analysis
Currently, plaintiffs in Lamberton v. Sullivan have moved for
summary judgment in the Federal District Court for Arizona.121
Like Hazard, Falin, and We Who Care, Lamberton involves a chal-
lenge to a rule as arbitrary and capricious. 122 However, the rule is
also being challenged as a violation of the AFDC beneficiaries'
equal protection rights.123 The plaintiff in Lamberton alleges that
despite the ways in which AFDC and SSI beneficiaries are similarly
situated, the Secretary has chosen to give SSI beneficiaries less
stringent eligibility requirements under Title 42.124 The plaintiff
cites the automobile equity limitation and the resource limitation
as two ways in which it is more difficult for otherwise eligible appli-
cants to qualify for AFDC as opposed to similarly situated appli-
cants for SSI.125 However, "no rational basis, reasonably related to
any relevant statutory objective or policy, exists for the numerous,
pronounced disparities in the Secretary's regulation of the automo-
bile ownership interests equally subject, by law, to resource limits
determining eligibility for AFDC and for SSI.. ."126
120. See supra note 71.
121. Lamberton v. Sullivan, No. Civ 91-609 TUC-JMR (D. Ariz. filed Oct. 24,
1991). The facts of Lamberton are as follows. Plaintiff began receiving AFDC bene-
fits after her husband lost his job and went to prison. She is also a full time student
and a mother. When her 1973 Datsun started giving her trouble, she was forced to
sell it. However, because of where she lives, Lamberton did not have access to public
transportation for either herself or her children. In February 1991, Lamberton's
aunt gave her a 1985 Toyota Camry in good condition. In March, during the reappli-
cation process, Lamberton was denied further AFDC benefits because the blue book
value of her car was $4375. Had it not been for the value of the car, Lamberton
would have received a maximum of $353 per month. Id.
122. Id. at 2.
123. A violation of Equal Protection requires several things: 1. A Classification
must be established which either burdens one group or benefits another. 2. The clas-
sification must distinguish persons as dissimilar on an impermissible basis- race,
gender, national origin. The impermissible basis need not be obvious on the face of
the law. If the application of the law creates a classification, the court can then
determine if the classification is permissible. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886). 3. The classification must not rationally relate to a legitimate govern-
mental interest. These factors, however, will not be uniformly applied. A classifica-
tion can be more or less suspect; the governmental interest may be considered more
or less important; and the effects will not always appear harmful enough for the
courts to interfere, even if rational is not perfect. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 43
at 570-585.
124. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text; see also supra part II.C.
125. Lamberton, No. Civ 91-609 TUC-JMR, at 31-37.
126. Id. at 37.
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There are several weaknesses in this otherwise appealing ar-
gument. First, while the burden of the AFDC equity limit has been
placed largely on women and minorities,127 the regulation does not
explicitly treat the women and minorities dissimilarly from the ma-
jority. The disparate impact can be seen either as an effect of the
economic plight of the beneficiaries or as a cause of it. Because
there is no explicit discrimination, the court will give the regulation
a mid-level scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny.128 And, lastly, the
courts have been very sympathetic towards states and the govern-
ment allocating limited finances to social programs.
In order to establish that the automobile equity limit violates
equal protection, the court must accept: 1) that the limit places an
undue burden on women and minorities; 2) that the purpose of the
limitation was not solely for the purpose of cutting the budget, but
also was meant to ensure that the then eligible AFDC recipients
would remain eligible; and 3) because of the time that has passed
and the effects as described by Dr. Fisher's study, the regulation no
longer (assuming it once did) rationally relates to the legitimate
governmental interest.' 2 9
Unfortunately, the plaintiffs in the equity cases do not have
explicit discrimination to rely upon. Their argument is very similar
to one rejected by the Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Hackney.130
The majority opinions in Jefferson and Dandridge v. Williams 131
(which was relied upon heavily by the majority in Jefferson) do not
help the allegations in Lamberton.
C. Procedural Due Process
Thus far, plaintiffs in the automobile equity challenges have
failed to challenge the regulation as a violation of procedural due
process. The regulation in U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry pre-
sumed that because a person is claimed as a dependant on a par-
ent's tax return, he or she is not in need of food stamps. 132 The
automobile equity regulation makes a similar "irrebuttable pre-
sumption" - that owning an automobile, in which an AFDC recipi-
ent has more that $1500 equity, enables that person to attain self
reliance without AFDC. Based on Dr. Fisher's study, 133 it should
be possible to overcome this presumption. Also relevant is the fact
127. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
129. See supra note 124.
130. 406 U.S. 535 (1972); see supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
131. 392 U.S. 471 (1970); see supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
132. 413 U.S. 508 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
133. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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that AFDC recipients may have different needs in different
states.' 3 4 If the federal government wants to set an upper limit, it
should be determined by those states whose recipients would be
more dependent on an automobile. The limit was not intended to be
the same throughout the country - it was the upper limit, and
states could lower it based on their perceived needs. 13 5 However,
because of the passage of time, the $1500 now serves as both start-
ing and ending point for the states.13 6
However, because an equity limit may occasionally reflect
need (if set at an appropriate level), the court might be less willing
to invalidate this particular eligibility regulation. Whereas the
Murry plaintiffs' status as a dependent on an absent parent's tax
return could not in itself provide the family with any tangible bene-
fit, an automobile is a liquid asset that could provide much needed
cash to an AFDC family.' 3 7 But, the short term benefits of selling
an automobile do not aid in the long term purpose of AFDC. If, in
fact, it is AFDC's purpose to make parents and guardians self suffi-
cient,138 it would appear that ownership of an automobile would, in
most situations, contribute to this self-sufficiency. A reliable auto-
mobile would also enable an AFDC recipient to complete job train-
ing or their education faster, and with fewer interruptions. Given
these goals of the program and the effects of inflation, the procedure
of making a family ineligible for AFDC because of their automobile
seems irrational and an inaccurate determination of need.
D. The Problems with Court Challenges
Obviously, the challenges to AFDC rules are always risky.139
Their outcomes tend to be based on the current political cli-
134. See supra text accompanying notes 127-129.
135. See supra note 5.
136. In all of the current challenges, the states have kept the $1500 limit, rather
than reducing it as allowed by HHS.
137. AFDC applicants are often recently divorced women who, as a part of a prop-
erty distribution, have automobiles whose value is inconsistent with their income.
Cf. FISHER, supra note 75, at 132. However, the same woman would not be held
ineligible because she had a home in which she had $75,000 in equity. While the
desire to keep people in their homes is obvious, the unwillingness to accept the cur-
rent need for automobiles seems archaic.
138. See supra note 1.
139. One commentator stated that
[Tihe equal protection clause has proven to be of limited use in ex-
panding welfare eligibility and of no help in challenging the amount of
welfare grants. It is extremely unlikely that any further so-called fun-
damental interests that would lead to heightened scrutiny review will
be unearthed, and it is even more unlikely that the Court will liberalize
the basic equal protection doctrine in the foreseeable future. Therefore,
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mate,140 and recently the Supreme Court has not been willing to
expand rights which Congress has not explicitly authorized.141
Although the arbitrary and capricious approach in Hazard is likely
to get the desired result in some of the cases being litigated, it also
is not entirely satisfying. As exemplified by the different results,
there is no real guideline for courts to determine when a regulation
is arbitrary.142 The courts have been able to choose the justifica-
tion for the regulation they prefer, and make an apparently legiti-
mate decision based on it. This approach also forces the welfare
beneficiaries and their advocates to litigate whenever a promul-
gated rule goes out of date.
IV. Alternatives to Court Challenges
A longer term solution would be one in which Congress forced
the Secretary to take into account the economic realities of life, such
as inflation and the need for cost of living increases, when deter-
mining eligibility requirements for welfare beneficiaries. If these
figures were tied to inflation rates, and there was no increase in
poverty rates, then the number of eligible applicants should remain
stable.143 If, in fact, the intention is to reduce or increase the over-
all number of people on AFDC and other programs, then Congress
should specifically state this purpose when authorizing the agency
to promulgate the rule.
Section 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) is an example of a legislative
attempt to keep entitlements in line with current economic condi-
tions. The section required that states
provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to
determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to
reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were es-
tablished, and any maximums that the State imposes on the
amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately
adjusted .... 144
the potential for use of equal protection challenges to aid welfare recipi-
ents is negligible....
Barbara Sard, The Role of the Courts in Welfare Reform, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
367, 374 (1988).
140. "[Tlhe Supreme Court has always been reluctant to move far away from the
views of the majority. This is particularly true when the implications for requiring
increased expenditures are clear." Id.
141. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 102-120 and accompanying text.
143. If poverty rates are increasing, then based on its purpose, expenditures for
AFDC should rise accordingly. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23)( 198 8).
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This section of Title 42 was used to invalidate at least one system
by which AFDC benefits were established. In Rosado v. Wyman, 145
New York's system for establishing benefits was held invalid be-
cause it "decreased by some $40 million the State's public assist-
ance undertaking."'146
Because it was limited to use in 1969, this particular statute
has outlived its usefulness. However, it does show that Congress
has occasionally been willing to fix glaring inequities in the system.
Currently, SSI benefits are protected by such a regulation.147 The
regulation requires that individual and couple benefits be adjusted
in accordance with the Consumer Price Index.14 8 Fixing the bene-
fits for AFDC will not necessarily change the eligibility standards.
But, there are a few ways in which to fix the problem with the eq-
uity limit.
First, the Secretary can adjust the equity limit to a more rea-
sonable level on her own. Since 1986, the Secretary has received
letters questioning the validity of the current automobile equity
limit.149 In all of the responses, the Secretary repeated the
agency's position that the amount is reasonable, while also allowing
for the possibility for change.150 When, in 1988, Congress passed
the Family Support Act, 15 1 it failed to adjust the automobile equity
limit. Congress did, however, request that the Secretary review the
current limit.152 While all of this leads to the conclusion that the
Secretary would have changed the automobile equity regulation, so
far the Secretary has vigorously defended the limit in all of the
challenges.
145. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
146. Id. at 407.
147. 20 C.F.R. § 416.405 (1993).
148. The Current regulations state that the Secretary of HHS will increase the
unrounded yearly SSI benefit amount by the same percentage by which the title II
benefits are being increased based on the Consumer Price Index, or, if greater the
percentage they would be increased if the rise in the Consumer Price Index were
currently the basis for the title II increase. 20 C.F.R. § 416.405(1993). See generally
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.270-404.277 (explaining how the title II cost-of-living adjustment is
computed).
149. Lamberton v. Sullivan, No. Civ 91-609 TUC-JMR (D. Ariz. 1993) (in Plain-
tiffs' Supplemental Appendix of Supporting Exhibits, Exhibits E, F, G & H). Letters
about the limit were written by Sen. George J. Mitchell of Maine, South Carolina
Gov. Richard Riley, Sen. Bob Packwood of Oregon, and Jeffrey M. Daly, Administra-
tive Supervisor, Sussex County Welfare Bd, Newton, NJ.
150. Id.
151. Pub. L. No. 102-318 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. III 1992)).
152. They "direct[ed] the Secretary to review regulations establishing limits on
the value of a vehicle and to revise them if he determines revision would be appropri-
ate." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 998, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. at 188-89, reprinted in 1988
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2776, 2976-77.
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This delay is probably due in part to the fact that both the
federal and state governments bear the cost of additional AFDC re-
cipients when eligibility requirements are changed.' 5 3 In contrast,
the federal government alone bears the cost when a change is made
to the SSI program. While the funds ultimately all come from the
taxpayers, it may be harder to convince 50 state legislatures of the
need to increase spending on an unpopular program.' 5 4 The state
of Minnesota has taken its own steps to remedy the problem. The
state legislature has authorized the commissioner of human serv-
ices to
seek from the United States Department of Health and Human
Services a waiver of the existing requirements of the AFDC pro-
gram . . . in order to eliminate barriers to employment for
AFDC recipients.
(b) The commissioner shall seek a waiver to set the maxi-
mum equity value of a licensed motor vehicle which can be
excluded as a resource.., at $4,500 because of the need of
AFDC recipients for reliable transportation to participate
in education, work, and training to become economically
self sufficient.155
This type of statute eliminates the problems of imposing additional
expenses on already strapped state budgets, but can only be imple-
mented on a state-by-state basis.
The most straightforward approach would be for the Secretary
to eliminate the automobile equity limit altogether, or change it so
that most income eligible people would have no problem because
they own a car. When promulgating the $4500 equity limit for SSI
recipients, part of the Secretary's reasoning was that "[flew
automobiles owned by SSI individuals are worth more than $4500,
and it is very rare that a first automobile worth more than $4500
does not qualify for exclusion because of how it is used. . "156
AFDC recipients do not have these exclusions.
If the Secretary were to eliminate the limit altogether, she
would be recognizing the necessity of a reliable car for most people.
Although AFDC has a complete exclusion for homes, 1 57 it is more
likely that an AFDC eligible person will have more than $1500 eq-
uity in a car than that s/he will have equity in a home. While the
image of an AFDC recipient riding around town in a Cadillac might
upset Congress and the Secretary, this scenario seems preferable to
153. See Law, supra note 24, at 1327.
154. "Reliance upon state and local financing creates inescapable pressures to
keep AFDC subsistence grants inadequate. Many states and localities are finan-
cially weak." Id. at 1326-27.
155. MINN. STAT. § 256.734 (1993) (Waiver of AFDC Barriers to Employment).
156. 50 Fed. Reg. 42686 (1985). See supra note 5 for examples of exclusions.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(7)(B)(i)(1988).
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burdening each AFDC recipient with an unreliable auto, and thus
increasing the time and effort it takes the AFDC recipient to
achieve self sufficiency. This time represents extra costs to the
system.
Next to the reform of the health care system, the biggest issue
Congress will face this term is welfare reform. Welfare reform, for
most members of Congress, is no more than a plan to get recipients
off of benefit programs as quickly as possible and to cut the costs
involved. In such a climate, it is hard to imagine the passage of a
bill which could increase the overall numbers of recipients in the
short term. Therefore, a law repealing the automobile equity limit
is unlikely in the near future.
Conclusion
While the current climate is not very encouraging for most
AFDC beneficiaries, the arbitrary and capricious challenge to the
automobile equity regulation is the most promising vehicle for
change to the current limit. However, it would be short sighted to
ignore the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection challenges to
AFDC regulations. Although they are not presently likely to be ac-
cepted by the federal judiciary, they do serve an important purpose.
By containing some emotional arguments which are hard to find in
the arbitrary and capricious argument, Equal Protection argu-
ments add some bite to each challenge. While on their own these
arguments may fail, the Equal Protection issues may make the ar-
bitrary and capricious arguments more appealing. Lastly, by keep-
ing the idea of entitlements as a protected property interest alive,
plaintiffs increase the possibility that a future court will accept this
argument than if we abandon it entirely.
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